Physicalism Or Something Near Enough

An Exploration of the Mind-Body Problem

Physicalism Or Something Near Enough is a groundbreaking philosophical work that delves deep into the mind-body problem. Authored by the esteemed philosopher Jaegwon Kim, this book, published as part of the Princeton Monographs In Philosophy series, presents a comprehensive analysis of physicalism and its different variants.

Overview

The concept of physicalism suggests that everything that exists in the world ultimately boils down to physical entities, structures, and processes. From this perspective, mental states and events can be reduced to physical properties, such as brain activities or processes occurring within the nervous system.

In Physicalism Or Something Near Enough, Kim explores various theories and arguments related to physicalism. He scrutinizes different approaches to the mind-body problem, including reductive physicalism, supervenience physicalism, nonreductive physicalism, and anomalous monism.

Physicalism, or Something Near Enough (Princeton Monographs in Philosophy Book 19)

by Jaegwon Kim(Kindle Edition)

4.6 out of 5

Language	:	English
File size	:	980 KB
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Screen Reader	:	Supported
Enhanced typesetting	:	Enabled
Word Wise	:	Enabled
Print length	:	201 pages

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Contributions and Controversies

This monograph makes significant contributions to the understanding of physicalism and its limitations. Kim presents thought-provoking arguments that challenge traditional views and propose alternative perspectives. Throughout the book, he engages with numerous philosophical ideas and theories, offering readers a rich tapestry of intellectual exploration.

One of the notable features of Kim's work is his emphasis on what he refers to as "something near enough physicalism." According to this viewpoint, while complete reduction of mental states to physical states may be problematic, a weaker version of physicalism that acknowledges the dependence of the mental on the physical still holds merit.

Physicalism Or Something Near Enough has stirred significant debates within the philosophical community. Scholars have engaged in spirited discussions regarding Kim's arguments, and the implications they have on our understanding of consciousness, mental causation, and the nature of reality.

Relevance in Contemporary Philosophy

As new scientific discoveries and advancements shed light on the intricate workings of the brain, the mind-body problem continues to captivate philosophers and scientists alike. Physicalism Or Something Near Enough provides valuable insights into this enduring philosophical puzzle.

By examining the relationship between the physical and the mental, Kim's work stimulates critical thinking and encourages a multidisciplinary approach. This monograph serves as a bridge between philosophy, neuroscience, psychology, and other related fields, fostering a fruitful exchange of ideas.

Physicalism Or Something Near Enough is an indispensable addition to the field of philosophy, particularly for those interested in the mind-body problem. Kim's meticulous analysis, thought-provoking arguments, and innovative ideas make this work a must-read for students, academics, and anyone passionate about grappling with profound philosophical questions.

Physicalism, or Something Near Enough (Princeton Monographs in Philosophy Book 19)

by Jaegwon Kim(Kindle Edition)

4.6 out of 5

Language	:	English
File size	:	980 KB
Text-to-Speech	:	Enabled
Screen Reader	:	Supported
Enhanced typesetting	:	Enabled
Word Wise	:	Enabled
Print length	:	201 pages

FREE

Contemporary discussions in philosophy of mind have largely been shaped by physicalism, the doctrine that all phenomena are ultimately physical. Here, Jaegwon Kim presents the most comprehensive and systematic presentation yet of his influential ideas on the mind-body problem. He seeks to determine, after half a century of debate: What kind of (or "how much") physicalism can we lay claim to? He begins by laying out mental causation and consciousness as the two principal challenges to contemporary physicalism. How can minds exercise their causal powers in a physical world? Is a physicalist account of consciousness possible?

The book's starting point is the "supervenience" argument (sometimes called the "exclusion" argument),which Kim reformulates in an extended defense. This argument shows that the contemporary physicalist faces a stark choice between reductionism (the idea that mental phenomena are physically reducible) and epiphenomenalism (the view that mental phenomena are causally impotent). Along the way, Kim presents a novel argument showing that Cartesian substance dualism offers no help with mental causation.

Mind-body reduction, therefore, is required to save mental causation. But are minds physically reducible? Kim argues that all but one type of mental phenomena are reducible, including intentional mental phenomena, such as beliefs and desires. The apparent exceptions are the intrinsic, felt qualities of conscious experiences ("qualia"). Kim argues, however, that certain relational properties of qualia, in particular their similarities and differences, are behaviorally manifest and hence in principle reducible, and that it is these relational properties of qualia that are central to their cognitive roles. The causal efficacy of qualia, therefore, is not entirely lost.

According to Kim, then, while physicalism is not the whole truth, it is the truth near enough.